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Recognizing the ease with which oral communication can be 
recorded and distributed in an increasingly technological society, the 
Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Eavesdropping Law 
(IEL) to protect an individual’s right not to be recorded without her 
permission.
1
 The IEL, most recently amended in 1994, prohibits 
recording oral communication between conversing parties without 
both parties’ consent.
2
 Notably, the IEL criminalizes recording without 
consent, regardless of whether the conversing parties intended the 
communication to be private.
3
  
Tension between eavesdropping statutes and the First 
Amendment brought similar statutes under review in numerous 
                                                 
1
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circuits throughout the country.
4
 In 2012, the Seventh Circuit 
addressed this issue in American Civil Liberties Union v. Alvarez.
5
 In 
Alvarez, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the IEL over its 
police accountability program, in which ACLU members would 
publish audiovisual recordings of police officers performing their 
duties.
6
 Overturning the district court’s dismissal of the ACLU’s 
amended complaint, Judge Sykes, writing for the majority, granted the 
ACLU injunctive relief and analyzed in detail the constitutionality of 
the IEL under the First Amendment.
7
 In doing so, the majority held 
that the ACLU would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that the 
IEL violates rights protected by the First Amendment.
8
 Judge Posner 
dissented, arguing that the IEL survives the intermediate scrutiny test 
under the First Amendment because it protects the legitimate 
government interest of privacy.
9
 
 This Comment proposes that while the Seventh Circuit 
correctly found that the IEL is likely unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment, the court incorrectly characterized the right to record as 
the expansive right of expression guaranteed by the plain text of the 
First Amendment. Instead, the Seventh Circuit should have found that 
the right to record falls within the more narrow right to gather 
information under the First Amendment, which the Supreme Court of 
the United States first dictated in Branzburg v. Hayes.
10
 Part I of this 
Comment provides an overview of the IEL and the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Alvarez. Part II of this Comment analyzes how the 
Supreme Court of the United States and other federal circuits have 
characterized the right to record as a right to gather information under 
the First Amendment. Finally, Part III of this Comment argues that the 
                                                 
 
4
 Glik v. Cuniffee, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 
5
 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 586 (7th 












 Id. at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 
10
 Id. at 586 (majority opinion); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-680 
(1972). 
2
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Seventh Circuit should adopt this narrower interpretation of the First 
Amendment and characterize the right to record as the limited right to 




A. The evolution of the Illinois Eavesdropping Law 
 In 1961, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the original IEL, 
which prohibited the use of “an eavesdropping device to hear or record 
all or part of any oral conversation without the consent of any party 
thereto.”
11
 An eavesdropping device is defined as any device that may 
be used to hear or record an oral conversation for the purpose of 
eavesdropping.
12
 The committee comment notes of the 1961 statute 
indicate a clear intent to protect the privacy of conversation between 
individuals.
13
 However, the statute was amended in 1976, emphasizing 
the legislature’s concern for consent over privacy.
14
   
The 1976 amendment required the consent of all parties to the 
conversation before the conversation could be recorded legally.
15
 
However, in 1986, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Beardsley 
narrowly interpreted the 1976 amendment to prohibit recording only 
those conversations that were intended to be private, regardless of 
consent.
16
 In Beardsley, the defendant was convicted under the IEL for 
recording two police officers from the back of their squad car.
17
 The 
Illinois Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction under the 
IEL, despite the fact that the defendant did not have permission to 
record either police officer, as required by the 1976 amendment.
18
 
Instead, the court interpreted the IEL statute to apply only to those 
                                                 
11




 Celia G. Gamrath, A Lawyer's Guide to Eavesdropping in Illinois, 87 Ill. B.J. 
362, 363 (1999). 
14
 § 5/14-2(a)(1). 
15
 Id.; Gamrath, supra note 13, at 363-64. 
16
 People v. Beardsley, 115 Ill.2d 47, 49 (1986). 
17
 Id. at 50. 
18
 Id.  
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situations where the conversing parties had an expectation of 
privacy.
19
 Because the police officers conversed in front of the 
defendant, the court held they had no expectation of privacy from his 
recording.
20
 Accordingly, the court reversed the defendant’s 
conviction, finding that there was no violation of the IEL.
21
    
Eight years later, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
interpretation that recording a conversation was only punishable under 
the IEL if the conversing parties had an expectation of privacy.
22
 In 
People v. Herrington, a defendant was found not to have violated the 
IEL where she secretly recorded a conversation she had with a suspect 
without his consent.
23
 Like in Beardsley, the court in Herrington found 
that the suspect had no expectation of privacy from the person he was 




In response to the Illinois Supreme Court’s reluctance to give 
weight to the consent requirement of the 1976 amendment, the Illinois 
legislature amended the IEL once again in 1994.
25
 This time the 
legislature unequivocally contradicted the Illinois Supreme Court’s 
precedent by prohibiting the recording of conversations “regardless of 
whether one or more of the parties intended their communication to be 
of a private nature,” thus overriding the Beardsley and Herrington 
decisions.
26
 In doing so, the Illinois legislature gave teeth to the 1976 





                                                 
19
 Id. at 56. 
20
 Id. at 64. 
21
 Id. at 65. 
22
 People v. Herrington, 163 Ill.2d 507, 510 (1994). 
23
 Id. at 511-12. 
24
 Beardsley, 115 Ill.2d at 50; Herrington, 163 Ill.2d at 510. 
25
 Illinois Eavesdropping Law, 720 ILCS § 5/14-1(d) (1994); Beardsley, 115 
Ill.2d at 65; Herrington, 163 Ill.2d at 511. 
26
 § 5/14-1(d); Beardsley, 115 Ill.2d at 65; Herrington, 163 Ill.2d at 511. 
27
 720 ILCS §§ 5/14-1(d)-2(a)(1); Gamrath, supra note 13,  at 363-64. 
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B. American Civil Liberties Union v. Anita Alvarez 
In 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union challenged the 
constitutionality of the Illinois legislature’s amendment to the IEL 
through a preliminary injunction. In Alvarez, the Seventh Circuit, in 
evaluating the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits, 
conducted a detailed analysis of the constitutionality of the IEL, noting 
that in First Amendment cases, “the likelihood of success on the merits 
will often be the determinative factor.”
28
  The court also noted that 
appellate review of an injunction is appropriate where the case “raises 
only a legal question,” like in Alvarez.
29
 
The district court found the ACLU lacked standing for two 
reasons, but the first was cured before appeal.
30
 The second reason 
was the basis for the district court’s dismissal of the ACLU’s 
complaint.
31
 The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint 
because it found that the First Amendment does not protect a right to 
audio record, and thus the ACLU could not allege a constitutional 
injury.
32
 However, on appeal, the majority held that the right to audio 
record is expression protected by the First Amendment, so the court 




                                                 
28
 Joelner v. Village of Washington Park, Ill., 378 F.3d 613, 620 (7th Cir. 
2004). 
29
 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 590 (7th Cir. 
2012)(citing Wis. Right to Life State PAC v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 151 (7th Cir. 
2006)) (holding that plaintiff’s injunction was properly decided on appeal because it 
raised a pure legal question under the First Amendment). 
30
 After the ACLU amended its complaint, the District Court found the ACLU 






 Id. at 590. 
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1. The Majority’s Analysis 
 
The majority began its analysis by discounting the district 
court’s reading of Potts v. City of Lafayette.
34
 The district court had 
based its dismissal of the ACLU’s complaint on the Seventh Circuit’s 
language in Potts, which stated “there is nothing in the Constitution 
which guarantees the right to record a public event.”
35
 However, the 
Seventh Circuit found the district court’s reading of Potts to be too 
narrow, and pointed to other language within the opinion which stated 
that the right to record, or the right to gather information, may be 
limited under proper time, place or manner restrictions applicable to 
content-neutral regulations.
36
  The court cited this language as 
evidence that, even in Potts, the court considered the right to record to 
be protected, at least in part, by the First Amendment.
37
  
The district court also dismissed the ACLU’s complaint 
because it found there could be no reciprocal right to receive speech 
without a willing speaker.
38
 However, the Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that Alvarez does not implicate the “willing speaker doctrine” because 
the speech has already taken place, been heard, or been “received.”
39
 
The court noted that anyone standing within earshot of an officer can 
hear what he says, so the speech has been received, and it requires no 
“presupposed willing speaker.”
40
 Therefore, the remaining question is 
only whether the government can restrict the way in which speech is 
received.
41
 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit centered its analysis in 
Alvarez on this issue.
42
 The court analyzed the right to audio record as 
                                                 
34
 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 591 (citing Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 




 Potts, 121 F.3d at 1111 (holding that an officer may refuse entry to an 
onlooker at a Ku Klux Klan rally for bringing a video camera onsite because the 
camera could be used as a weapon or projectile in a volatile situation). 
37
 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 590-91. 
38






 Id. at 595. 
42
 Id. at 595. 
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two protected First Amendment rights: a) the right of free expression; 
and b) the right to gather information.
43
 First, the court argued that 
audio recording is an integral step in the speech process, such as note 
taking, and should be equated with free expression.
44
 Next, the court 





a. The Seventh Circuit’s characterization of the right to 
record as free expression. 
 
The majority stated that audiovisual recordings are media of 
expression commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of 
information and ideas and thus are “included within the free speech” 
guarantee of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
46
 The court 
reasoned that by prohibiting audiovisual recording, the IEL 
“forecloses an entire medium of expression,” preventing individuals 




The court cited various examples to illustrate this notion, 
including an individual’s ability to take notes, write, or paint a public 
event without the consent of those participating.
48
 The majority found 
these actions to be part of a process of expression, which if regulated, 
would ultimately regulate free expression.
49
 The Seventh Circuit 
referred to the Supreme Court’s campaign-finance cases to further 
illustrate this point.
50
 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that 
restricting how money can be spent on political communication 
necessarily reduces the quantity and quality of expression.
51
 Similarly, 
the Seventh Circuit argued that restricting the medium of audiovisual 
                                                 
43
 Id. at 598. 
44
 Id. at 595-98. 
45
 Id. at 598. 
46
 Id. at 595. 
47
 Id. at 596. 
48




 Id. at 596-97. 
51
 Id. at 596 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 4 (1976)). 
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recording would also limit the breadth and depth of topics, which 
would otherwise be discussed after the distribution of these 
recordings.
52
 More specifically, the court reasoned that the ACLU’s 
intent to record police officers would spark discussion, criticism, and 
speech about government conduct, speech that lies at the core of the 
First Amendment.
53
 The court held that because the IEL restricts a 





b. The Seventh Circuit’s characterization of the right to 
record as the narrower right to gather information. 
 
The majority then transitioned from its argument that 
audiovisual recording is a step in the overall process of expression to 
exploring the narrower right to gather information under the First 
Amendment.
55
 The court cited the Supreme Court opinion Branzburg 
v. Hayes, where a journalist was compelled to reveal his confidential 
source to a grand jury despite the burden this revelation had on his 
newsgathering function.
56
 Despite the outcome of Branzburg, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged within the opinion that newsgathering 
qualifies for First Amendment protection, noting, “Without some 
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated.”
57
 However, the Court in the same opinion cautioned 
against an expansive right to gather information.
58
 Ultimately, the 
Seventh Circuit relied on Branzburg to establish that some, at least 





                                                 
52
 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 596-97. 
53
 Id. at 597. 
54
 Id. at 599. 
55
 Id. at 597. 
56
 Id. at 598; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972). 
57
 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 598; Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. 
58
 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 598-99. 
59
 Id. at 597-98. 
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c. The Seventh Circuit applies its analysis to find that the 
statute is likely unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment. 
 
The court then analyzed which standard of scrutiny should be 
applied to the IEL.
60
 Because content-specific regulations are 
presumptively invalid, they are subject to strict scrutiny.
61
 Contrarily, 
content-neutral regulations are subject to intermediate scrutiny, 
requiring that a statute’s means reasonably achieve a significant 
governmental interest. 
62
 Thus, a content-neutral regulatory measure 




In Alvarez, the court found it “unlikely that strict scrutiny will 
apply” because the IEL restricts all audio recordings regardless of 
what is recorded and thus is content-neutral on its face.
64
 In holding 
so, the court rejected the ACLU’s argument that because a court would 
have to hear the recording to determine if it violated the IEL, it must 
be content specific.
65
 On the contrary, the court acknowledged that it 
is often necessary for a judicial body to hear or see speech to 
determine if it violates a law, but that need alone does not make the 
law a content-specific regulation.
66
  Accordingly, the court applied the 
intermediate standard of scrutiny and found that the statute is likely 
unconstitutional under even this lower standard.
67
 
Although the court acknowledged that the government has a 
significant interest in privacy, it held that the 1994 amendment to the 
IEL does not reasonably achieve this interest.
68
 Because the 1994 
amendment criminalizes recording conversation without the consent of 
all the parties, regardless of the fact that the speech was said publicly, 
                                                 
60




 Id. at 604-605. 
63
 Id. at 605. 
64
 Id. at 604. 
65




 Id. at 607. 
68
 Id. at 605. 
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out-loud, and without any secrecy, the court reasoned that it is overly 
broad, and thus overly restricting of a protected First Amendment 
right.
69
 Under the 1994 amendment, if a person did not obtain the 
consent of a public speaker, she could be prosecuted under the IEL for 
recording conversation that was intended to be public. As such, the 
court went to great lengths to distinguish a statute that criminalizes the 
recording of private conversation from a statute that criminalizes the 
recording of any conversation.
70
 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit 
found that the IEL is likely unconstitutional under the First 




2. Judge Posner’s Dissent 
 
Judge Posner, in his dissent, cited three main reasons for 
dissenting from the majority’s analysis: 1) people retain an expectation 
of privacy even in public forums; 2) there is a significant government 
interest in ensuring the safety of officers, informants, and witnesses; 
and 3) the majority’s interpretation will have a chilling effect on 
speech.
72
  For these reasons, Judge Posner would have affirmed the 
decision of the District Court and held for the defendant in this case.
73
 
First, Judge Posner went to great lengths to establish that 
people retain some expectation of privacy even in public settings. He 
cited various examples to illustrate this point, including a situation 
where a police officer may be speaking with a victim in a low voice on 
a crowded sidewalk.
74
 He argued that even though there are people 
within earshot, as the IEL requires, the conversing parties might still 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
75
 Civilians speaking to 
police officers might also retain an expectation of privacy when they 
                                                 
69
 Id. at 607. 
70
 Id. at 605-06. 
71
 Id. at 608. 
72
 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 610 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
73
 Id. at 610. 
74
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are conversing with an officer. This holds particularly true when the 
civilian is a victim, witness, or informant trying to communicate 
urgently, but privately, with the police.
76
 Judge Posner asserted that 
public spaces still include speakers with reasonable privacy 
expectations.
77
 Moreover, he argued that the IEL seeks to protect 
exactly this privacy by requiring consent of the conversing parties.
78
 
Thus, he suggested that there is a governmental interest in protecting 
private conversation that occurs in public places. As such, under his 




Second, Judge Posner cautioned the majority on the dangerous 
effect the Alvarez decision may have on future police activity.
80
 He 
painted a picture where both civilians and officers are put at risk when 
private information is released to the public.
81
 He also stated that 
distracting officers from their duties by requiring them to anticipate a 
recording in a society where almost every individual regularly carries 
a recording device in their phone is detrimental to the safety of the 
officer and the people he seeks to protect.
82
 
Third, and finally, Judge Posner used both of these compelling 
governmental interests to illustrate that the majority’s attempt to 
protect First Amendment rights will have the exact opposite effect, 
and will instead chill free expression.
83
 Judge Posner discussed the 
significant impact that a recording has on the credibility of an 
individual, much more of an impact than note taking or recitation.
84
 
He emphasized that this is particularly true in a society where things 
are uploaded to the Internet and distributed within seconds.
85
 Judge 
Posner argued that allowing individuals to take audio recordings of 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 611-612. 
77
 Id. at 613-614. 
78






 Id. at 611. 
82
 Id. at 612-13. 
83
 Id. at 609. 
84
 Id. at 614. 
85
 Id. at 612. 
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people without their consent will make people overly cautious about 
what they can say, thus deterring free expression .
86
 Consequently, 
Judge Posner dissented from the majority, and found that the ACLU 
would not likely succeed on the merits.  
 
II. SUPREME COURT AND FEDERAL CIRCUITS INTERPRET THE RIGHT 
TO RECORD AS THE RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION 
 
Though the Supreme Court has never ruled on the right to take 
an audiovisual recording of a police officer, it has more broadly 
acknowledged a First Amendment right to gather information.
87
 
Various circuits, in interpreting the right to audio record officers, have 
ruled in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Branzburg, 
and found that the right to record stems from a limited First 




A. Supreme Court 
 
As discussed in Section B of this Comment, the Supreme Court 
of the United States first recognized the right to gather information in 
Branzburg v. Hayes. In that case, the Court reasoned that in order for 
the press, or people, to have the right to speak, they must first have 
some smaller right to seek out information. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the First Amendment to protect at least 
some right to gather information.
89
  
However, the Court has also cautioned against finding that the 
right to speak and publish carries with it the unrestrained right to 
gather information.
90
 Instead, the Court acknowledged that the right to 
gather information, if interpreted too broadly, would have detrimental 
effects on government functions, such as judicial, administrative, and 
                                                 
86
 Id. at 613-14. 
87
 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972). 
88
 Glik v. Cuniffee, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
89
 Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 708. 
90
 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of 
Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986). 
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 The right to gather information, when 
characterized as a narrow First Amendment right, can be weighed 
properly against other governmental interests, such as privacy. 
However, as the Seventh Circuit noted in Alvarez, the Supreme Court 





B. Other Circuits 
 
Since Branzburg, other federal circuits have relied upon the 
Supreme Court’s delineation of the First Amendment right to gather 
information when evaluating the validity of eavesdropping statutes. 
The First Circuit in Glik v. Cuniffee held that police officers 
were not entitled to qualified immunity for arresting the plaintiff for 
recording the officers performing their public duties.
93
 Under a 
qualified immunity analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an 
officer violated a clearly established constitutional right. In Glik, the 
court held that the officers violated the plaintiff’s clearly established 
right to record matters of public concern. Notably, the court reasoned 
that the right to record matters of public concern derives from the 
limited right to gather information under the First Amendment, rather 
than the expansive right of free expression.
94
  
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Smith v. City of Cumming 
held that the right to photograph and videotape police conduct is 
protected by the First Amendment right to gather information about 
what public officials do on public property.
95
 The court further held 
that the right to gather information is a limited First Amendment right 
that is subject to reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.
96
 
Though the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has not heard this 
issue, its district courts have also reasoned in Robinson v. Fetterman 
                                                 
91
 Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665 at 706. 
92
 Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 599-600. 
93




 Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
96
 Id. at 1332-1333. 
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and Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood that the right to film 
police officers in the performance of their public duties is derived 
from the right to gather information under the First Amendment.
97
  
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized a 
limited First Amendment right to gather information.
98
 When 
presented with eavesdropping statutes, several circuits, including the 
First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, have all interpreted the right to 
audio record as a right to gather information under the First 
Amendment, subject to reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions.
99
 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit should also find that the 
right is derived from a limited right to gather information under the 
First Amendment, rather than equating audiovisual recording to free 
expression. 
 
III. SEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD INTERPRET THE RIGHT TO AUDIO 
RECORD AS A LIMITED FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
GATHER INFORMATION 
 
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Flawed Legal Reasoning 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet decided 
whether the right to audio record officers is free speech.
100
 Instead, the 
Court has set out a limited right to gather information under the First 
Amendment.
101
 The circuits have interpreted the right to audio record 
government officials as a right to gather information under the First 
Amendment. The Seventh Circuit should follow the precedent outlined 
by the Supreme Court and other federal circuits and find that the First 
Amendment right raised by the IEL is the right to gather information, 
rather than free expression itself. 
                                                 
97
 Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F.Supp.2d 534, 541 (E.D.Pa. 2005); Pomykacz 
v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F.Supp.2d 504, 513 (D.N.J. 2006). 
98
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As the First Circuit noted in Glik, the right to audio record 
police officers is central to an individual’s ability to collect 
information about the government and its activities.
102
 As the majority 
noted in Alvarez, the reason the IEL violates the First Amendment is 
because it prevents individuals from exercising their ability to collect 
and disseminate information about the police.
103
 Moreover the ACLU, 
in its challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, centered its 
arguments on the notion that citizens have a right to ensure that police 
officers are held accountable for their actions in performing their 
public duties.
104
 However, as the Supreme Court indicated in 
Branzburg, though collecting information about the government is 
central to the protections of the First Amendment, it is not equal to the 
right of free expression. Here, the IEL prohibits the act of recording, 
not the act of speaking. In fact, the IEL puts no restriction on an 
individual repeating a conversation she hears, or publishing the 
contents of that information.
105
 Thus, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly 
equates the right to record someone else’s speech as the right to 
express one’s own speech.
106
  
This analysis returns us to the district court’s reasoning that 
free expression cannot exist without a willing speaker.
107
 While the 
Seventh Circuit was correct in its assertion that the “unwilling speaker 
doctrine” is not implicated where the speech has already been 
received, the court incorrectly dismissed the district court’s argument 
without acknowledging that there is something inherently different 
about reusing the speech of a person who does not wish her voice to be 
shared.
108
 This forced dissemination of expression implicates rights 
that are much more similar to the right of an individual to forcibly 
gather information about governmental activities. Contrary to the 
                                                 
102
 Glik v. Cuniffee, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
103
 Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 651 (2012). 
104
 Id. at 608. 
105
 Illinois Eavesdropping Law, 720 ILCS § 5/14-1(a) (1994). 
106
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majority’s assertion, limiting the extent to which an individual may 
record speech does not raise the same vexing concerns that prohibiting 
a person from freely expressing their own thoughts would have.
109
 
Specifically, the majority analogized the right to record to 
many actions that qualify as free expression under the First 
Amendment.
110
 For example, an individual enjoys the right to take 
notes during governmental committee meetings.
111
 However, this 
analogy fails to account for the fact that taking notes still requires 
independent thought, and disseminating the information requires 
independent expression. In contrast, recording a police officer’s voice 
and distributing it simply regurgitates speech. Moreover, even if a 
person were to take notes verbatim, this transcript is still less 
egregious than the voice recording of a person because the recording 
damages credibility in a way that notes could not. With an audio 
recording a person cannot simply deny the allegations made against 
her, and her credibility is impeached in an irreversible way. The 
ACLU seeks to use audio recordings because they have a unique 
ability to, as Judge Posner indicated in his dissent, damage the 
credibility of an individual. Thus, this uniqueness must be 
acknowledged when evaluating its nature under the First Amendment. 
The majority also analogized the right to record to the right to 
donate campaign funds.
112
 However, the fatal flaw in this analogy is 
that donating campaign funds still involves willing free expression. 
Campaign donations provide individuals with the ability to use money 
as an instrument of expression to promote their own ideas. In contrast, 
an audio recording promotes ideas that often times the speaker does 
not want promoted. The act of recording a conversation at its most 
basic level involves gathering information, without any expression. 
Even if we adopt the majority’s view that recording speech is only an 
integral step in the process of sharing that recording, recording speech 
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110
 Id. at 590. 
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is still the forced dissemination of expression rather than the free 
dissemination of it.
113
 While this audio recording may still enjoy First 
Amendment protection, it does so under the First Amendment right to 
gather information from an unwilling source. 
All of the examples cited by the majority, the right to take 
notes, the right to paint, the right to donate campaign funds, 
necessarily involve free and willing expression.
114
 Contrarily, 
disseminating an audio recording against the speaker’s wishes 
involves the forced dissemination of speech. In equating audio 
recording to free expression the majority failed to give this meaningful 
distinction its due weight. As such, the majority’s delineation may 
negatively impact future First Amendment analysis.   
 
B. Detrimental Policy Implications 
 
The majority’s mischaracterization of the right implicated by 
the IEL will likely impact future First Amendment analysis. By 
equating audio recording with the vast First Amendment right of free 
expression, the majority has given audio recording an unbridled scope 
of protection. While it is important to acknowledge that people have a 
right to acquire information about their government, and to hold police 
officers accountable for their actions, this right is limited, and must be 
weighed against other governmental interests.  
As Judge Posner indicated in his dissent, it is important to 
weigh the state’s interest in protecting the safety of its officers and 
citizens with the need to protect the privacy of its inhabitants.
115
 This 
Comment does not assert the state’s interests were reasonably 
achieved by the IEL statute, but it does suggest that there are other 
governmental interests which should be weighed with a limited First 
Amendment right to gather information, rather than the expansive First 
Amendment right to speak freely. 
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 Id. at 610 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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In the Branzburg opinion, the Court acknowledged the very 
concerns that are implicated by the IEL.
116
 In Branzburg, the Court 
held that recognizing an overly broad right to gather information might 
negatively impact governmental functions.
117
 That is exactly the 
concern raised by the State in this case. As Judge Posner indicated, 
permitting audio recording, even in public places, may still chill 
speech because it makes a person weary to express their thoughts for 
fear of the distribution of her ideas.
118
 It also distracts police officers 
from their duties, and places both their lives and the lives of Illinois’ 
citizens at risk.
119
 Because the nature of the right in question in 
Alvarez raises many of the same concerns that the Supreme Court 
considered in Branzburg, it is more suitable to evaluate audio 
recording under Branzburg’s categorization of First Amendment 
rights. By acknowledging that the right to audio record is a limited 
First Amendment right, the Seventh Circuit would be able to more 
accurately balance the state’s compelling interest in protecting the 




Though the Seventh Circuit correctly found that the IEL was 
likely unconstitutional under the First Amendment, the court 
mischaracterized the right implicated by audio recording. The Seventh 
Circuit should rule consistently with the First, Third, and Eleventh  
Circuits and find that the right to audio record is a limited First 
Amendment right to gather information, as stated by the Supreme 
Court in Branzburg. By acknowledging the limits of this right, the 
Seventh Circuit will be able to more accurately weigh the various 
governmental interests asserted by the State against the rights 
implicated by the IEL.  
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